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Abstract 
 
In this study several matching procedures have been used to evaluate the impact of public R&D 
support received by Italian manufacturing firms over the three-year period 2004-2006. Data are from 
the Capitalia-UniCredit survey and estimations refer to a sample of 605 treated firms (untreated are 
2414). The evidence is mixed and depends on the objective-variable under consideration. As far as the 
total amount of R&D investments is concerned, the role of public support to innovation is positive and 
significant, while no impact has been found when considering the R&D intensity and the share of sales 
due to innovative-products. These differences in results are quite regular, whatever the matching 
method applied in the evaluation. 
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1 Introduction 
 
There are two main arguments to explain the low 
level of private R&D investments. The first refers to 
the appropriability of basic research. If technology is 
a quasi-public good then the incentive to invest will 
be reduced because each firm will try to take 
advantages from the innovative efforts made by 
others. The final outcome is a level of innovative 
activities which is lower than that desirable at an 
aggregate level (Arrow 1962). The second element 
influencing R&D investments relates to capital-
market imperfections. The risk of research leads 
investors to increase the cost of financing innovation 
and, as a consequence, tends to reduce the amount of 
research made by the private sector. This is 
particularly true for Italy, a country with a low 
propensity to innovate due to specific characteristics 
of its industrial sector which is dominated by small 
firms and by firms operating in low-tech sectors. 
These considerations help to understand state 
intervention in favour of R&D activities. Any 
innovation policy is aimed at making up for the 
difference between social and private returns on R&D 
innovations and ensuring financial facilities to 
innovators, particularly in the first stage of the 
innovation process. While the initial objective of 
R&D policy is to increase the amount of innovative 
activity, the general scope of any research and 
innovation policy is to strengthen the position of each 
country among the leading knowledge and 
competence-based countries. In other words, public 
support for private R&D is a good policy option per 
se because increasing technological potential through 
sizeable investments should lead to innovation and, 
ultimately, growth in an economy. This is basically 
the mission of many R&D programmes, such as, for 
example, Europe 2020 which is part of the EU's 
growth strategy to promote a more competitive 
economy in the coming years. With regards to the 
theme of this paper, it is of value to point out that, 
among many other objectives, Europe 2020 fixes at 
3% the proportion of the EU's GDP to be invested in 
R&D up to 2020. According to the EU commission, 
this is a pre-requisite to have a smart-growth which is 
based on more effective investments in education, 
research and innovation. As mentioned before, the 
level of actual R&D efforts is lower than the 
optimum and very far from 3%. For instance, in Italy, 
R&D investments were 1,26% of GDP in 2010, while 
the average of the EU-27 was around 2% (the 
intensity was more than 3% in some Nordic countries 
(Finland, Sweden, Denmark) and more than 2% in 
Austria, France, Germany and Slovenia. However, 
compared to the early 2000s, Italy has increased its 
innovative efforts by about 20-25 basis points from, 
R&D investments of just over 1% of GDP in 2000.  
However if, and to what extent, the objectives of 
R&D programmes have been achieved is an empirical 
issue to be addressed through an evaluation study. 
This paper analyses the effect of the innovation 
policy from which a sample of Italian manufacturing 
firms benefitted from 2004 to 2006. With this goal, 
the literature is followed and an ex-post evaluation is 
carried out by using the counterfactual approach, 
which - through different methods - permits the 
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measurement of what would have happened without 
the policy. In order to assess the impact of Italian 
R&D policy support at firm level, the matching 
techniques are applied, just as in Almul and Czrnitzki 
(2003), Czrnitzki and Licht (2005), Herrera and Heijs 
(2007), Duguet (2004), Gonzalez and Pazò (2008). 
Data used in this paper are from the survey 
carried out by Capitalia-UniCredit (2008) and cover 
the years 2004-2006. This source allows precise 
identification of whether a firm has received a policy 
support within R&D programmes or not. The 
possibility of distinguishing the two groups of treated 
and untreated gives an advantage in that the analysis 
does not suffer from the potential bias of other 
sources of public funding, as would be the case if we 
only paid attention to a specific scheme without being 
able to control for the presence of other policies. In 
this, the paper is similar to many other studies. 
However, this is not without cost. Indeed, knowing 
whether a firm participates or not in a programme 
impedes to assess the role of the different policies 
implemented in favour of private innovation in Italy. 
Therefore, the results are meant to be the average 
effect of overall R&D policies adopted in Italy in the 
period 2004-2006. We find that R&D policy has been 
effective in increasing the amount of R&D 
investments made by firms, although the effect 
disappears when considering the intensity of 
innovative efforts. There is similar inconclusive 
evidence with regard to the impact of R&D policy on 
the capability of firms to sell innovative products. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next 
section presents a brief break-down of the sample of 
firms used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 
describes the methodology, while section 4 looks at 
the results and concludes.. 
 
2 The sample of Italian manufacturing 
firms  
 
This analysis uses data from the survey carried out by 
Unicredit-Capitalia in 2008 for the years 2004-2006. 
This survey comprises standard balance sheets and 
collects a great deal of qualitative information on firm 
characteristics for a sample of about 4,500 Italian 
manufacturing firms, including all firms with more 
than 500 workers and a representative subsample of 
firms with more than ten workers (the stratification 
used by Unicredit-Capitalia considers location, size 
and sector). With regards the objective of this paper, 
the Unicredit-Capitalia survey comprises information 
regarding firms’ R&D investments in 2004, 2005 and 
2006, the value of innovative products as a share of 
total sales (averaged over 2004-2006), the type of 
innovation introduced and whether firms benefitted 
from public support for R&D activities over the 
period 2004-2006. There is no information on the 
source of financing, i.e. whether the support was 
activated as part of local, national or European 
projects - or on the amount of funding received. 
Table 1 presents the sample of firms, classifies 
firms by size and distinguishes the innovative from 
the non-innovative firms and those receiving R&D 
public support. The entire sample is comprised of 
3,019 firms, many of which are small (the proportion 
of firms with sales below 5 million euros in 2004-
2006 is 26%). The share of firms with a value of sales 
below 50 million euros is about 88%. Only 2.19% of 
firms are big. This distribution is roughly repeated in 
the case of supported firms, which number 625, that 
is to say 20% of the entire sample. Thus, the sample 
is formed of 605 treated and 2,414 untreated firms. 
From data displayed in table 1, it emerges that the 
majority of firms (2,445 out of 3,019) are non-
innovators, in the sense that they did not introduce 
any product/process innovation over the years under 
scrutiny. The imbalance of firms in favour of non-
innovators is also found when considering the sub-
sample of supported firms. In this case, in fact, 483 
out of 605 firms received public aid over the three-
year period 2004-2006, but they introduced no 
innovation. In the group of supported-non innovators, 
the distribution by size indicates a large presence of 
small firms: 283 out of 483 firms - that it is to say 
60% of the sub-sample -  register sales of less than 10 
million euros. In brief, the sample is dominated by 
non-supported firms, no-innovators and small-sized 
firms. 
 
3 The empirical setting 
 
This paper aims at assessing the effect of R&D 
support on the innovative activities of Italian firms. 
For each firm, we observe the amount of R&D 
investment and the sales of innovative products as a 
share of total sales. To truly know the effect of R&D 
policy, it is necessary to compare the observed 
outcome (the so-called factual outcome) with the 
outcome that would have occurred had that firm not 
benefitted from public support (the counterfactual 
outcome). The latter is unobservable and, therefore, 
represents an evaluation problem. The issue is to 
provide an estimation of the counterfactual which 
allows a calculation of the policy-effect. In order to 
evaluate the counterfactual, this paper refers to the 
literature on non-experimental methods because of 
the non-randomness of the assignment of firms to the 
groups of beneficiaries. To be more precise, the 
matching methodology is used. The empirical 
analysis takes place in two steps.  
First, the study identifies a group of untreated 
firms which are as similar as possible to the treated. 
Initially, the analysis deals with the curse of 
dimensionality (firms may be similar in a given 
dimension but different in others), which we address 
by using the propensity score. The matching between 
treated and untreated is carried out by using an index 
of the probability of being treated, known as the 
propensity score. In this sense, the propensity score 
forms the basis for the match. This approach 
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addresses the problem of a non-random assignment to 
the programme and controls the groups of treated and 
untreated by comparing observations that are similar 
concerning their characteristics. The idea of 
considering observable variables is to eliminate the 
initial differences between treated and untreated so 
that the assignment to the programme is random. This 
is known as the Conditional Independence 
Assumption (CIA) and ensures to control for sample 
selection bias. In other words, if the CIA holds, then 
the differences between treated and untreated can be 
attributed to the R&D programme. In order to test the 
quality of results, different goodness-of-fit measures 
are used and some robustness checks are performed.  
In the second step of the analysis, the group of 
matched-untreated firms is identified and the ATE, 
that is to say the effect of R&D policies on the 
treated, is measured. As shown below, in order to test 
the robustness of the effect, matching has been 
carried out in different ways. 
 
3.1 The participation model 
 
Firms’ participation in the R&D programme is 
modelled as a binary choice, where the dependent 
variable takes the value of one if the firm is in the 
group of beneficiaries and zero if it does not actually 
benefit from any support. The propensity score is 
obtained as a conditional probability of being in the 
programme, provided a set of firm’s characteristics. 
Following the related literature, a broad variety of 
variables that might have an influence on a firm’s 
decision to participate in a R&D programme is used. 
The variables are the following: firm size and firm 
age, total debts, cash flow, number of patents, a 
dummy equal to unity if the credit obtained is less 
than that the firm required at the market interest rate, 
and a measure of human capital. In estimating the 
probit equation, we also control for sector and South 
effects. In order to control for sectoral heterogeneity 
which might be influential in determining the 
probability of participating in the programme, we 
include dummy S4 which is unity if the firm operates 
in science-based sectors and zero otherwise, that is to 
say the dummy is zero if the firm belongs to one of 
the other three Pavitt sectors (supplied-dominated 
sectors, scale intensive sectors, specialised suppliers). 
We also use the variable South which is a binary 
variable equal to unity if the firm is located in the 
South of Italy and zero otherwise. The variable South 
is supposed to capture the non-observable differences 
between the Centre-North and the South of Italy. 
Results are displayed in table 2. Despite our 
interest is in understanding the effectiveness of the 
policy, it is useful to briefly discuss some results. It is 
interesting to point out that the probability of being 
treated is negatively dependent on the age of the 
company, in the sense that the probability of 
participating is higher for young firms than older 
ones. The evidence shows that size does not affect the 
probability of being treated, while significant impact 
has been found with regards to cash flow: the higher 
the internal finance, the lower the probability of 
participating in the R&D programme. Although the 
statistical significance is not high, similar results 
emerge for the effect of debt on the probability of 
participating. Finally, being located in Southern 
Italian regions reduces the probability of participating 
in a public programme of support for private R&D 
activities (Table 2). 
The usefulness of considering a participation 
model is that it helps to balance the distribution of 
firms’ variables across the two groups of treated and 
untreated firms. In this respect, the balancing 
property of the propensity score must be satisfied 
before proceeding with the matching of firms 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). This condition 
requires that firms with the close propensity score 
must have the same distribution of observable 
covariates independently of the treatment status. This 
ensures that, for any propensity score value, the 
assignment to treatment is meant to be “random” and, 
therefore, treatment and control units are 
observationally identical, on average. Put in a 
different way, the balancing property says that treated 
and controls are close in terms of observables and, 
therefore, that matching is possible. From a practical 
perspective, the test is an iterative procedure. It 
requires treated firms to be divided into a number of 
strata according to their estimated propensity scores. 
When, in each stratum, the regressors of the probit 
model do not differ between treated and untreated, 
then the participation model may be considered 
adequate to balance firms’ characteristics.  In the case 
of imbalance, even in a single stratum, the second 
step is to consider strata more finely. It might be that 
the property is not satisfied whatever the strata. This 
leaves room for modifying the participation model 
through the introduction of higher-order terms 
(squares, cubes etc.) for particular variables or for 
interactive terms. Hence, this test can provide a useful 
diagnostic with regard the specification of the 
participation model. The model specification 
presented in table 2 is that which guarantees that the 
balancing propriety is satisfied.   
  After it has been verified that the participation 
model satisfies the balancing propriety, the next step 
is to select the outcome-variables of interest so as to 
determine their average values between treated and 
untreated-matched firms and to use the difference in 
average as a measurement of the impact of R&D 
programme. In order to pursue this goal, firms must 
be matched and this is done by referring to different 
procedures, as is shown in the following section. 
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3.2 Number of firms to be selected: 
matching at work 
 
The first matching is performed through the nearest 
neighbour method (henceforth NNM), where each 
treated firm is matched with the untreated firm with 
the most similar propensity score. The selection of 
controls has been carried out with repetition. This 
means that the possibility of assigning the same non-
treated to more than one treated was not excluded a 
priori. Table 3 indicates that the number of units 
included in the untreated control group is 399, a value 
lower than 481, which is the number of treated firms 
used in the matching under the restriction of common 
support.  
Through NNM, it is possible to match a treated 
with a control with a very different value of its 
propensity score, because it is the closest among 
those available. This caveat is overcome by fixing a 
minimum distance between the two propensity scores 
to be matched. This is the idea of radius matching, 
which ensures that for each treated, the group of 
controls is comprised of all the firms whose 
propensity score has a distance that is less than or 
equal to a certain "radius" (which will tend to be very 
close to zero: for example 0.01). Results may be 
sensitive to the size of the radius that is the basis for 
matching: the smaller the radius, the more difficult it 
is to find a match within that range and this will lead 
to a greater number of cases failing the support 
requirement. In this study, three radii are considered, 
0.1, 0.05 and 0.01. Table 3 shows that there are 
always more than 1,900 matching-untreated firms. It 
can also be noted that the number of treated used in 
the matching is 480 when the radii are 0.05 and 0.01. 
This means that only one firm is excluded because 
there is no control whose propensity score is within 
the interval defined by those radii.  
The third approach used in matching the firms is 
the stratification method according to which the 
propensity score is divided into strata, in such a way 
that, within each strata, the treated firms and the un-
treated firms have the same propensity score, on 
average. As table 3 shows, the stratification method 
uses 481 treated firms and 1,912 untreated firms. 
Finally, firms are matched by using kernel 
matching, through which all untreated firms are used 
as controls. This means that all the information 
available is used in the analysis, as all firms  - treated 
and non-treated  - are included in the estimate of the 
treatment effect. Under the common support 
requirement, 481 firms are used by the kernel 
matching as participants and 1,912 as nonparticipants 
in the R&D programme. 
Before passing on to the discussion of the 
treatment effect, it is essential to verify if the 
matching is appropriate. The importance of whether 
the participation model satisfies the balancing 
condition has already been discussed. A further 
confirmation of the appropriateness of the matching 
comes from comparison of the estimated propensity 
scores across treated and controls. This comparison 
provides a useful diagnostic tool to evaluate how 
similar treated and controls are and, therefore, how 
reliable the estimation strategy is. Figures 1 and 2 
display the estimated propensity scores before and 
after matching. In figure 1, the kernel of propensity 
score for treated firms is compared to that obtained 
for the sample of the potential group of control, 
while, in figure 2, the focus is on the group of firms 
used as controls and obtained applying the NNM. As 
can be seen, the matching works well given that the 
overlapping of distribution improves moving from 
figure 1 to figure 2. As the graph of the propensity 
score distributions after the matching shows, both 
groups of firms are well balanced with respect to the 
propensity score. 
 
Figure 1. Kernel density of PS before matching 
 
 
Estimated propensity score, kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0106 
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Figure 2. Kernel density of PS after matching 
 
 
Estimated propensity score kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0106 
                                  
 
4 Discussion and conclusion 
 
Previous sections mention that the paper is 
aimed at evaluating the impact of R&D policy 
support received by a sample of Italian firms over the 
2004-2006 period. Due to the lack of other 
information about the type and amount of funds 
received by these firms, the only research question 
that we can ask is whether the subsidized firms 
perform better than firms that did not receive any 
support. As in all evaluation programs, the next and 
final step regards the identification of the outcome-
variables, that is the variables that R&D policy is 
expected to change. Just as with many other papers in 
this field of research, the outcome variable selected is 
the R&D investments made by firms. The Capitalia-
UniCredit survey reports on the annual amount of 
money spent on R&D investment by firms. We utilise 
R&D expenditure in absolute terms and as R&D 
intensities (R&D expenditures as a share of total 
sales). While R&D investment is an input of the 
innovative process carried out by firms, there may 
also be interest in investigating the effect on output of 
innovative effort. In this respect, we consider the 
proportion of sales which is due to innovative 
products.  
Results of the calculation of ATE obtained 
through matching methods are presented in table 2, 
where, for each variable-outcome and each method, 
we summarise the number of treated and controls, the 
average of the variable for treated - labelled Y(1)  - 
and untreated - labelled Y(0), the mean difference, 
Y(1)-Y(0), and the value of t-statistics obtained with 
bootstrap. In panel A, the results are those under the 
common support condition, while this condition has 
been relaxed in panel B.   
The calculation of counterfactual outcome 
differs across the methods. In the case of NNM, it is 
the average value of the output-variable for the 
untreated, while, in the case of the radius method, it is 
obtained by averaging the outcome-variable of 
controls belonging to the radius. The stratification 
method uses two steps. Firstly, the procedure 
determines the mean difference between Y(1) and 
Y(0) in each stratum. It is like a policy effect within 
each stratum. The overall impact is calculated as the 
weighted-average of differences in the various strata, 
where the weights are the number of treated firms in 
each strata. The idea is to give more weight to the 
strata with many treated firms. With regard to the 
kernel matching, the counterfactual Y(0) for each i-th 
participant is determined as a kernel-weighted 
average of the outcome of untreated, where the 
weight of each j-th untreated is in proportion to how 
close its propensity score is to that of the i-th treated 
firm.   
Let us now present the main results of the 
analysis. When considering the NNM estimator and 
the common support requirement, it is found that the 
average R&D intensity is 0,88% for the 481 
subsidised firms and 0,49% for the group of 399 
treated. Thus, the resulting effect is about 0,4% and is 
statistically different from zero even after 
bootstrapping. However, this evidence is not robust to 
the procedure used for matching. Indeed, the average 
treatment effect remains positive and amounts to 
about 0,15% with any method other than nearest 
neighbour, but its significance is lost. Similar results 
have been found without the common support 
condition. Based on this, it may be concluded that 
public R&D policy does not generate a significant 
positive effect on the R&D efforts (measured through 
R&D intensities) of Italian manufacturing firms. 
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Table 2 also displays estimations of the average 
treatment effect on the level of R&D investments. In 
this case, the picture changes drastically. With 
regards the effect obtained using the NM method, it is 
found that, on average, the treated firms invest about 
969 thousand euros in R&D, while the untreated-
matched firms invest 273 thousand euros. This 
difference represents the ATE which amounts to 696 
thousand euros. More importantly, this difference is 
statistically diverse from zero, as the bootstrapped t-
value is 2.9. For a robustness check, it is necessary to 
look at the other estimations. It emerges that the set 
of untreated is comprised of more than 1,900 firms 
and the resulting average of R&D investments is 
always more than 400 thousand euros. This implies 
that the mean difference decreases (ranging from 535 
to 576 thousand euros), but, above all, that ATE is 
always statistically significant. The same applies 
when the common support hypothesis does not hold.  
To sum up, the impact of R&D support depends 
on the method used to measure the R&D efforts. 
When the outcome-variable is expressed in absolute 
terms, that are the value of R&D investments, the 
evaluating analysis yields a positive robust significant 
effect of incentives, while no conclusion can be 
drawn when using the intensity of R&D activities. 
The impact on inputs is useful to the extent that 
it is accompanied by a similar impact on the outcome 
variables of the innovation process. Assessment of 
the effects on output responds to the question of 
whether the results that are observed are due to the 
subsidy, and to what extent they would have been 
obtained even in the absence incentive. In this sense, 
we consider the sales on innovative products 
(expressed as the percentage of total sales). Data refer 
to 2006. The analysis shows that, on average, 
innovative products account for about 8% of firms' 
sales. While this amount is slightly higher for 
untreated than for treated, the difference is not 
statically significant, whatever matching procedure is 
used.   
 
Table 1. The sample of Italian manufacturing firms, by size (2006-2008) 
 
 Innovative Firms Non Innovative Firms 
Firm  
size 
(Sales) 
All Sample 
Supported 
Firms 
Supported 
Non 
Supported 
Total Supported 
Non 
Supported 
Total 
Num. % Num. % Num. % Num. % Num. % Num. % Num. % Num. % 
< 5 mln 794 26,3 161 26,6 18 14, 8 80 17,7 98 17,1 143 29,6 553 28,2 696 28,5 
5 -10  
mln 
842 27,9 181 29,9 38 31,1 107 23,7 145 25,3 143 29,6 554 23,2 697 28,5 
10-50 
mln 
1016 33,7 191 31,6 45 36,9 174 38,5 219 38,2 146 30,2 651 33,2 797 32,6 
50- 250 
mln 
301 9,97 55 3,1 11 9,0 74 16,4 85 14,8 44 9,1 172 8,8 216 8,8 
> 250 
mln 
66 2,19 17 2,8 10 8,2 17 3,8 27 4,7 7 1,4 32 1,6 39 1,6 
Total 3019 100 605 100 122 100 452 100 574 100 483 100 1962 100 2445 100 
Source: computation on data from Unicredit's survey (2008) 
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Table 2. The partecipation model  
 
Panel A: Estimations 
  
 Coefficinet Std. Err. z 
Constant -1,12 0,427 -2,63 
Age -0,003 0,001 -2,26 
Size -0,0116 0,026 -0,45 
Pavitt4 0,232 0,137 1,7 
South -0,128 0,108 -1,19 
White Collars 0,00009 0,00026 -0,36 
Debts -0,21 0,116 -1,78 
Cash flow -0,82 0,265 -3,1 
Patent 19,08 8,34 2,29 
Patent^2 -119,68 86,18 -1,39 
Credit 0,279 0,092 3,03 
Obs. 2403 
  
LRchi2(9) 35,94 Prob>chi2=0 
Log likelihood = -1185.0512 
  
Pseudo R2       =     0.0149 
  
The region of common support is [.07523965, .52167644] 
Panel B: Description of the estimated propensity score 
Percentiles      Smallest 
  
1% 0,102 0,075 
 
5% 0,131 0,077 
 
10% 0,146 0,081 
 
25% 0,170 0,082 
 
50% 0,199 
  
75% 0,224 0,460 
 
90% 0,255 0,474 
 
95% 0,289 0,483 
 
99% 0,347 0,521 
 
 Obs. 2393 Std. Dev. 0,048 
 Sum of Wgt 2393 Variance 0,002 
 Mean 0,20 Skewness 0,982 
  
 
Kurtosis 6,159 
Source: see table 1 
 
The final number of blocks is 9 – This number of 
blocks ensures that the mean propensity score is not  
 
different for treated and controls in each blocks. The 
balancing property is satisfied.  
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Table 3. Table 3 R&D Investments, R&D Intensity and Sales of Innovative Products of Italian Manufacturing Firms in 2006 
Average Effect of Parteciaption in R&D Policy from different Matching Method 
 
 
Number of 
Treated Firms 
Number of 
Untreated 
Matched 
Firms 
Y(1) Y(0) 
Mean 
Difference 
Y(1)-Y(0) 
Bcctstrapp 
ed t-values 
Number of 
Treated 
Firms 
Number 
of 
Untreated 
Matched 
Firms 
Y(1) Y(0) 
Mean 
Difference 
Y(1)-Y(0) 
Bcctstrapp 
ed t-values. 
 
With Common Support Without Common Support 
R&D Investments 
Nearest Neighbor Matching 4SI 399 969 273 696 2,9 605 S99 969 334 635 2,63 
Radius Matching (0,1) 4SI 1912 969 405 564 2,7 4SI 1922 969 405 564 2,62 
Radius Matching (0.05) 480 1909 971 415 556 2,5 4SI 1919 969 416 553 2,64 
Radius (0,01) 430 1907 971 436 535 2,54 480 1912 971 434 537 2,54 
Stratification 4SI 1912 969 393 576 2,65 481 1922 969 333 581 3,03 
Kernel 4SI 1912 969 401 568 2,53 605 2414 969 401 568 3,13 
R&D intensity in 2006 (R&D Investments to Total Sales)    
Nearest Neighbor 4SI 399 o,ss 0,49 0,39 3,03 481 889 0,88 0,51 0,37 2,8 
Radius (0,1) 4SI 1909 0,83 0,73 0,15 1,35 481 1922 0,88 0,74 0,14 1,3 
Radius (0.05) 430 1909 o,ss 0,73 0,15 1,34 4SI 1919 0,83 0,73 0,15 1,35 
Radius (0,01) 430 1907 0,33 0,73 0,15 1.34 4S0 1912 0,83 0,73 0,15 1,34 
Stratification 431 1912 o,ss 0,73 0,15 1,29 4SI 1922 0,33 0,72 0,16 1,33 
Kernel 431 1912 o,ss 0,73 0,15 1,3 605 2414 0,33 0,73 0,15 1,53 
Sales of Innovative Products (% of total sales) 
Nearest Neighbor 4SS 399 7,9a 9,35 -1,87 -1,44 481 889 7,98 8,06 -0,08 -0,072 
Radius (0,1) 4SI 1912 7,9S S,22 -0,24 -0,27 481 1922 7,93 8,22 -0,24 -0,27 
Radius (0.05) 430 1909 7,9S S,1S -0,2 0,22 4SI 1919 7,93 8,18 -0,2 -0,21 
Radius (0,01) 430 1913 7,97 s,os -0,11 -0,114 480 1912 7,93 S,07 -0,09 -0,11 
Stratification 431 1912 7,98 S,33 -0,35 -0,31 481 1922 7,98 8,34 -0,36 -0,38 
Kernel 4SI 1912 7,9a 8,28 -0,3 -0,32 605 2414 7,98 8,27 -0,29 -0,33 
Legenda: Y1 = Mean of output variables for Treated firms; Y0 = Mean of output variable for Untreated Matched firms
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